"We do not use statistics as an excuse not to get tough on criminals."
--Pamela Stephens, spokestype for federal Justice Minister Rob Nicholson
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
Thursday, May 13, 2010
Clutching Claude
Over at Lowetide's, an argument recently developed over the nature of "clutch" performances: some players are reputed to perform at their best in key games. I was one of several commenters taking the position that this was probably illusionary. One commenter challenged this view by asking "How else do you explain Claude Lemieux's playoff stats?" My response was as follows:
Regular season PPG: 0.647
Playoffs PPG: 0.675
What's to explain?
That was a little glib, though, primarily because scoring tends to go down significantly during the playoffs (each team is playing against better teams on average than they do in the regular season, after all); a quick analysis of the 2008-2009 season showed an 11% decrease (limiting the analysis to teams that qualified for the playoffs), so for Lemieux to have increased his scoring by 4% in those circumstances is actually pretty impressive, on its face.
I'm of the view that, when it comes to sports performance, statistics can tell the whole story, but sometimes you need a lot of them, so I decided to look into Lemieux's career in more detail. The first things that struck me as surprising had nothing to with my hypothesis, but I thought I'd mention them anyway: first, Lemieux only spent four seasons with the Avalanche (as an Oilers' fan, I suppose I have observer bias from seeing him so often during those four years), and second, the Devils of the early nineties were a higher-scoring team than the Avalanche of the late nineties. Anyway, onward.
If we're going to test the hypothesis that Lemieux was a clutch playoff performer, we need to compare his playoff production to his regular season production, and then adjust it for the decreased scoring during the playoffs. That last bit is the tricky part: you can't just apply an across-the-board decrease, because the decrease hasn't been the same from era to era and, more importantly, isn't the same from team to team: teams eliminated in early rounds, unsurprisingly, see a much bigger dropoff in scoring than those eliminated in later rounds. So what I decided to do was compare Lemieux's shift in production each year to his team's shift in production during the same year. This will produce some small sample sizes, especially in years in which Lemieux's team was eliminated early, but we'll worry about that later.
Claude Lemieux, it's worth noting at this point, was part of some pretty good hockey teams. Of course, he was a pretty good hockey player, so all else being equal a team with Claude Lemieux was better than a team without him, but he won the Stanley Cup with three different teams, and played with goalies like Patrick Roy (in both Montreal and Colorado) and Martin Brodeur, and scorers like Peter Forsberg and Joe Sakic. Good teams. This is supported by the fact that he appeared in 18 seasons' playoffs on six different teams; only the 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 Phoenix Coyotes failed to qualify. Moreover, despite the fact that in any given playoffs half of the teams are eliminated in the first round, Lemieux's teams advanced to the second round twelve times, to the third round nine, and to the Stanley Cup Finals five times.
Anyway, here are the annual production shifts for Lemieux and the teams for which he played (team stats are goals per game, while player stats are points per game). I've bolded the years that Lemieux performed better than his team.
1986 (Montreal):
Team: 4.13 to 3.08 (25% decrease)
Player: 0.30 to 0.80 (167% increase)
1987 (Montreal):
Team: 3.46 to 3.94 (14% increase)
Player: 0.70 to 0.76 (9% increase)
1988 (Montreal):
Team: 3.73 to 3.36 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.78 to 0.45 (42% decrease)
1989 (Montreal):
Team: 3.94 to 3.19 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.74 to 0.39 (47% decrease)
1990 (Montreal):
Team: 2.93 to 2.64 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.46 to 0.36 (22% decrease)
1991 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.40 to 3.00 (12% decrease)
Player: 0.60 to 0.57 (5% decrease)
1992 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.61 to 3.57 (1% decrease)
Player: 0.92 to 1.00 (9% increase)
1993 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.67 to 2.40 (35% decrease)
Player: 1.05 to 0.40 (62% decrease)
1994 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.64 to 2.60 (29% decrease)
Player: 0.56 to 0.90 (61% increase)
1995 (New Jersey):
Team: 2.83 to 3.35 (18% increase)
Player: 0.42 to 0.80 (90% increase)
1996 (Colorado):
Team: 3.98 to 3.64 (9% decrease)
Player: 0.90 to 0.63 (30% decrease)
1997 (Colorado):
Team: 3.38 to 3.12 (8% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 1.35 (118% increase)
1998 (Colorado):
Team: 2.82 to 2.29 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.55 to 0.86 (56% increase)
1999 (Colorado):
Team: 2.91 to 2.79 (4% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 0.74 (19% increase)
2000 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.06 to 2.65 (13% decrease)
Player: 0.54 to 0.43 (20% decrease)
2002 (Phoenix):
Team: 2.78 to 1.40 (50% decrease)
Player: 0.50 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
2003 (Dallas):
Team: 2.99 to 2.83 (5% decrease)
Player: 0.19 to 0.14 (26% decrease)
2009 (San Jose):
Team: 3.13 to 1.67 (47% decrease)
Player: 0.06 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
So of those eighteen playoff performances, he exceeded his team's performance eight times, and fell short of it ten times. That's about what you'd expect from a random sampling - slightly worse, actually. Of course, some of the times he exceeded his team's performance were pretty epic: 1986, 1995, and 1997, for example. But viewed as a whole, that's not the record of a "clutch" player, that's a "streaky" player: sometimes he's really on, and sometimes he's really off. If you divided his regular season play into twenty game segments, I have no doubt that you'd find some segments that looked a lot like 1986, and others that looked a lot like 1989. When you take a large sample size like the career of Claude Lemieux, sometimes things will go really well for periods of time, and other times they'll go really badly.
But let's be fair: the above treats all playoff years the same, which is misleading. After all, 2009 looks a little less like a total collapse on Claude Lemieux's part when you realize that he played all of one post season game. So let's sort the above years, not chronologically, but by the number of post-season games in which Lemieux played. Then, if we see that the bolded seasons all appear at the top, we can decide that he really is clutch.
2000 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.06 to 2.65 (13% decrease)
Player: 0.54 to 0.43 (20% decrease)
1986 (Montreal):
Team: 4.13 to 3.08 (25% decrease)
Player: 0.30 to 0.80 (167% increase)
1994 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.64 to 2.60 (29% decrease)
Player: 0.56 to 0.90 (61% increase)
1995 (New Jersey):
Team: 2.83 to 3.35 (18% increase)
Player: 0.42 to 0.80 (90% increase)
1996 (Colorado):
Team: 3.98 to 3.64 (9% decrease)
Player: 0.90 to 0.63 (30% decrease)
1999 (Colorado):
Team: 2.91 to 2.79 (4% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 0.74 (19% increase)
1989 (Montreal):
Team: 3.94 to 3.19 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.74 to 0.39 (47% decrease)
1987 (Montreal):
Team: 3.46 to 3.94 (14% increase)
Player: 0.70 to 0.76 (9% increase)
1997 (Colorado):
Team: 3.38 to 3.12 (8% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 1.35 (118% increase)
1988 (Montreal):
Team: 3.73 to 3.36 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.78 to 0.45 (42% decrease)
1990 (Montreal):
Team: 2.93 to 2.64 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.46 to 0.36 (22% decrease)
1991 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.40 to 3.00 (12% decrease)
Player: 0.60 to 0.57 (5% decrease)
1992 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.61 to 3.57 (1% decrease)
Player: 0.92 to 1.00 (9% increase)
1998 (Colorado):
Team: 2.82 to 2.29 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.55 to 0.86 (56% increase)
2003 (Dallas):
Team: 2.99 to 2.83 (5% decrease)
Player: 0.19 to 0.14 (26% decrease)
1993 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.67 to 2.40 (35% decrease)
Player: 1.05 to 0.40 (62% decrease)
2002 (Phoenix):
Team: 2.78 to 1.40 (50% decrease)
Player: 0.50 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
2009 (San Jose):
Team: 3.13 to 1.67 (47% decrease)
Player: 0.06 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
Of his "clutch" performances three took place in low sample size situations, in which his team was eliminated in the first round. If we confine our analysis to years where Lemieux's team qualified for the Stanley Cup finals, we see two "clutch" performances and three sub-expectation performances.
Claude Lemieux built his reputation as a playoff performer on his performances in 1986, 1999, and to a lesser extent 1994 and 1997. Some of those performances were remarkable, so it's only natural that they'll remain in our minds while, for example, his four series 1989 vanishing act is forgotten. But viewed in the context of his entire career, these were less "clutch" performances and more instances of a player's hot streaks happening to coincide with big games.
But what about that 4% overall career increase? Numbers are deceiving: throughout his career, Claude Lemieux played approximately one playoff game for every twenty regular season games he played. During his last four seasons, when his skills had faded, he played 214 regular season games and 13 playoff games. His consistently low points per game total during this period therefore dragged his regular season points per game total down significantly, but had very little effect on his playoff total. If we ignore those seasons, his regular season points per game climbs to 0.697, while his playoff points per game goes to .710 - leaving the increase at under 2%.
Regular season PPG: 0.647
Playoffs PPG: 0.675
What's to explain?
That was a little glib, though, primarily because scoring tends to go down significantly during the playoffs (each team is playing against better teams on average than they do in the regular season, after all); a quick analysis of the 2008-2009 season showed an 11% decrease (limiting the analysis to teams that qualified for the playoffs), so for Lemieux to have increased his scoring by 4% in those circumstances is actually pretty impressive, on its face.
I'm of the view that, when it comes to sports performance, statistics can tell the whole story, but sometimes you need a lot of them, so I decided to look into Lemieux's career in more detail. The first things that struck me as surprising had nothing to with my hypothesis, but I thought I'd mention them anyway: first, Lemieux only spent four seasons with the Avalanche (as an Oilers' fan, I suppose I have observer bias from seeing him so often during those four years), and second, the Devils of the early nineties were a higher-scoring team than the Avalanche of the late nineties. Anyway, onward.
If we're going to test the hypothesis that Lemieux was a clutch playoff performer, we need to compare his playoff production to his regular season production, and then adjust it for the decreased scoring during the playoffs. That last bit is the tricky part: you can't just apply an across-the-board decrease, because the decrease hasn't been the same from era to era and, more importantly, isn't the same from team to team: teams eliminated in early rounds, unsurprisingly, see a much bigger dropoff in scoring than those eliminated in later rounds. So what I decided to do was compare Lemieux's shift in production each year to his team's shift in production during the same year. This will produce some small sample sizes, especially in years in which Lemieux's team was eliminated early, but we'll worry about that later.
Claude Lemieux, it's worth noting at this point, was part of some pretty good hockey teams. Of course, he was a pretty good hockey player, so all else being equal a team with Claude Lemieux was better than a team without him, but he won the Stanley Cup with three different teams, and played with goalies like Patrick Roy (in both Montreal and Colorado) and Martin Brodeur, and scorers like Peter Forsberg and Joe Sakic. Good teams. This is supported by the fact that he appeared in 18 seasons' playoffs on six different teams; only the 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 Phoenix Coyotes failed to qualify. Moreover, despite the fact that in any given playoffs half of the teams are eliminated in the first round, Lemieux's teams advanced to the second round twelve times, to the third round nine, and to the Stanley Cup Finals five times.
Anyway, here are the annual production shifts for Lemieux and the teams for which he played (team stats are goals per game, while player stats are points per game). I've bolded the years that Lemieux performed better than his team.
1986 (Montreal):
Team: 4.13 to 3.08 (25% decrease)
Player: 0.30 to 0.80 (167% increase)
1987 (Montreal):
Team: 3.46 to 3.94 (14% increase)
Player: 0.70 to 0.76 (9% increase)
1988 (Montreal):
Team: 3.73 to 3.36 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.78 to 0.45 (42% decrease)
1989 (Montreal):
Team: 3.94 to 3.19 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.74 to 0.39 (47% decrease)
1990 (Montreal):
Team: 2.93 to 2.64 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.46 to 0.36 (22% decrease)
1991 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.40 to 3.00 (12% decrease)
Player: 0.60 to 0.57 (5% decrease)
1992 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.61 to 3.57 (1% decrease)
Player: 0.92 to 1.00 (9% increase)
1993 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.67 to 2.40 (35% decrease)
Player: 1.05 to 0.40 (62% decrease)
1994 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.64 to 2.60 (29% decrease)
Player: 0.56 to 0.90 (61% increase)
1995 (New Jersey):
Team: 2.83 to 3.35 (18% increase)
Player: 0.42 to 0.80 (90% increase)
1996 (Colorado):
Team: 3.98 to 3.64 (9% decrease)
Player: 0.90 to 0.63 (30% decrease)
1997 (Colorado):
Team: 3.38 to 3.12 (8% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 1.35 (118% increase)
1998 (Colorado):
Team: 2.82 to 2.29 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.55 to 0.86 (56% increase)
1999 (Colorado):
Team: 2.91 to 2.79 (4% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 0.74 (19% increase)
2000 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.06 to 2.65 (13% decrease)
Player: 0.54 to 0.43 (20% decrease)
2002 (Phoenix):
Team: 2.78 to 1.40 (50% decrease)
Player: 0.50 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
2003 (Dallas):
Team: 2.99 to 2.83 (5% decrease)
Player: 0.19 to 0.14 (26% decrease)
2009 (San Jose):
Team: 3.13 to 1.67 (47% decrease)
Player: 0.06 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
So of those eighteen playoff performances, he exceeded his team's performance eight times, and fell short of it ten times. That's about what you'd expect from a random sampling - slightly worse, actually. Of course, some of the times he exceeded his team's performance were pretty epic: 1986, 1995, and 1997, for example. But viewed as a whole, that's not the record of a "clutch" player, that's a "streaky" player: sometimes he's really on, and sometimes he's really off. If you divided his regular season play into twenty game segments, I have no doubt that you'd find some segments that looked a lot like 1986, and others that looked a lot like 1989. When you take a large sample size like the career of Claude Lemieux, sometimes things will go really well for periods of time, and other times they'll go really badly.
But let's be fair: the above treats all playoff years the same, which is misleading. After all, 2009 looks a little less like a total collapse on Claude Lemieux's part when you realize that he played all of one post season game. So let's sort the above years, not chronologically, but by the number of post-season games in which Lemieux played. Then, if we see that the bolded seasons all appear at the top, we can decide that he really is clutch.
2000 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.06 to 2.65 (13% decrease)
Player: 0.54 to 0.43 (20% decrease)
1986 (Montreal):
Team: 4.13 to 3.08 (25% decrease)
Player: 0.30 to 0.80 (167% increase)
1994 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.64 to 2.60 (29% decrease)
Player: 0.56 to 0.90 (61% increase)
1995 (New Jersey):
Team: 2.83 to 3.35 (18% increase)
Player: 0.42 to 0.80 (90% increase)
1996 (Colorado):
Team: 3.98 to 3.64 (9% decrease)
Player: 0.90 to 0.63 (30% decrease)
1999 (Colorado):
Team: 2.91 to 2.79 (4% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 0.74 (19% increase)
1989 (Montreal):
Team: 3.94 to 3.19 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.74 to 0.39 (47% decrease)
1987 (Montreal):
Team: 3.46 to 3.94 (14% increase)
Player: 0.70 to 0.76 (9% increase)
1997 (Colorado):
Team: 3.38 to 3.12 (8% decrease)
Player: 0.62 to 1.35 (118% increase)
1988 (Montreal):
Team: 3.73 to 3.36 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.78 to 0.45 (42% decrease)
1990 (Montreal):
Team: 2.93 to 2.64 (10% decrease)
Player: 0.46 to 0.36 (22% decrease)
1991 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.40 to 3.00 (12% decrease)
Player: 0.60 to 0.57 (5% decrease)
1992 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.61 to 3.57 (1% decrease)
Player: 0.92 to 1.00 (9% increase)
1998 (Colorado):
Team: 2.82 to 2.29 (19% decrease)
Player: 0.55 to 0.86 (56% increase)
2003 (Dallas):
Team: 2.99 to 2.83 (5% decrease)
Player: 0.19 to 0.14 (26% decrease)
1993 (New Jersey):
Team: 3.67 to 2.40 (35% decrease)
Player: 1.05 to 0.40 (62% decrease)
2002 (Phoenix):
Team: 2.78 to 1.40 (50% decrease)
Player: 0.50 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
2009 (San Jose):
Team: 3.13 to 1.67 (47% decrease)
Player: 0.06 to 0.00 (100% decrease)
Of his "clutch" performances three took place in low sample size situations, in which his team was eliminated in the first round. If we confine our analysis to years where Lemieux's team qualified for the Stanley Cup finals, we see two "clutch" performances and three sub-expectation performances.
Claude Lemieux built his reputation as a playoff performer on his performances in 1986, 1999, and to a lesser extent 1994 and 1997. Some of those performances were remarkable, so it's only natural that they'll remain in our minds while, for example, his four series 1989 vanishing act is forgotten. But viewed in the context of his entire career, these were less "clutch" performances and more instances of a player's hot streaks happening to coincide with big games.
But what about that 4% overall career increase? Numbers are deceiving: throughout his career, Claude Lemieux played approximately one playoff game for every twenty regular season games he played. During his last four seasons, when his skills had faded, he played 214 regular season games and 13 playoff games. His consistently low points per game total during this period therefore dragged his regular season points per game total down significantly, but had very little effect on his playoff total. If we ignore those seasons, his regular season points per game climbs to 0.697, while his playoff points per game goes to .710 - leaving the increase at under 2%.
Monday, April 19, 2010
Steve fixes the Edmonton Oilers
As I've mentioned repeatedly in my status updates, it's exam time, and I'm running out of reasonable ways to procrastinate, so I'm starting to turn to really idiotic stuff. Accordingly, I just spent about half an hour deciding what I would do if I were the Oilers' GM, and because there's nothing more enjoyable than reading an uninformed sports fan's opinion of what he thinks the highly trained professionals managing his favourite sports team should be doing, I've decided to share the fruits of my labour with you.
My one rule is that I've tried to limit my options to things that the Oilers actually might do; with that in mind, while I think the they should jettison Khabibulin however they can, that's definitely not going to happen, so I'm leaving him in as the starting goalie. I'm also trying to avoid making the standard fan assumption that other teams are just itching to give us great players signed to value contracts in exchange for our flotsam; similarly, I'm trying to make realistic estimates of contract numbers. I might not be very good at either one, since I have no idea what I'm talking about, but I'm trying.
With that in mind, here's what I'd do if my last name were Tambellini.
Players under contract
Of players who could conceivably start next season in the NHL, fourteen are currently under contract with the Oilers next year. Like everybody else who played for the Oilers this year, they're a bunch of bums, but we can't get rid of all of them (or so I'm told), so we should figure out who we're keeping.
Shawn Horcoff (Signed through 2014-2015 at a cap hit of $5.5 million): Keep. The Oilers are not deep in defensively competent centres (please do not quote Horcoff's plus/minus unless you're prepared to also cite the underlying statistics), and Horcoff's contract is probably too big, and his 2009-2010 season too bad, to move. I actually don't think the contract is that bad: he was victimized this season by terrible linemates and some bad luck, and if he stays healthy, gets decent linemates, and stops being expected to do everything himself next year I think he either breaks 50 points or acts as an elite shutdown centre; $5.5 million's a lot for a guy in either of those roles, but it looks a lot better than paying $5.5 million for 36 points and a pile of goals against.
Dustin Penner (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $4.25 million): Keep, obviously. The only argument for trading him is if you think the Oilers have no chance of being competitive by 2011-2012, and I think that's premature. Plus, who knows? He might actually re-sign.
Ales Hemsky (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $4.1 million): Keep. Everything I said about Penner goes double for Hemsky (well, at least single).
Patrick O'Sullivan (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2.95 million): Buy out. I liked the trade that brought him in, but I was plainly wrong to do so. While it's unlikely that he could be traded, he's young enough that the buy out rules are very favourable.
Robert Nilsson (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2 million): Buy out. Everything I said about O'Sullivan also applies to Nilsson, except for the part about liking the trade that brought him here.
Ethan Moreau (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2 million): Trade our buy out. Nobody would take him at the trade deadline, so buy out might be the only realistic option (Jim Matheson says that the Oilers will do it, too), though his play did improve after the deadline. He's been the captain of what has by all accounts become an extremely dysfunctional team, and if the way he plays with the young guys (refusing to pass to them, taking offensive zone penalties to hamper their scoring chances) is any indication of the way he interacts with them off the ice, I don't want him anywhere near them.
Ryan Jones (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $0.975 thousand): Keep. If he was an impending unrestricted free agent I'd shrug my shoulders and let him walk, but he's big, can play some, and is under contract. I expect he'd spend the season on the fourth line and the press box, but you're not going to fill your roster with world-beaters.
Zach Stortini (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $700 thousand): Keep. He's cheap and he's a perfectly acceptable fourth liner (and still improving some, by my eye).
Sheldon Souray (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $5.4 million): Trade, obviously. I don't like doing it, because I have to think that we'll be taking back somebody even more overpaid than him, but he obviously has to go and a trade is the only realistic way of getting rid of him.
Tom Gilbert (Signed through 2013-2014 at a cap hit of $4 million): Keep. He and Whitney have the look of a legitimate top pairing, the Oilers are very short on legitimate NHL defenseman who haven't demanded to be traded, and Gilbert's trade value is suppressed at the moment by a season in which he didn't score much. In view of all that, there really isn't an argument for trading him.
Ryan Whitney (Signed through 2012-2013 at a cap hit of $4 million): Keep, for the same reasons as Gilbert, minus the suppressed trade value.
Ladislav Smid (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $1.3 million): Keep, for all the same reasons as Whitney, plus his could prove one of the best value contracts this year.
Taylor Chorney (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $942 thousand): Send him to the minors. I don't think he'd have to clear waivers, and he's not ready for the NHL (no shame in that, as defensemen are notoriously slow to develop). He's also a soft, offense-first defenseman on a team that badly needs somebody more like Andy Sutton.
Nikolai Khabibulin (Signed through 2012-2013 at a cap hit of $3.75 million): Keep, regretfully. He's old, overpaid, overrated, and facing drunk driving charges, but the Oilers have decided that he's their starting goalie, so there's not much point in arguing.
In summary, I'm proposing to keep five forwards, three defensemen, and one goalie at a total cap hit of $28.575 million. I'm not factoring in buy out effects because I'm too lazy to check what they are; apparently they're negligible, though, at least for O'Sullivan and Nilsson.
Restricted free agents
Of players who could realistically start 2010-2011 in the NHL, the Oilers have nine impending restricted free agents. Here's how I'd handle them.
Sam Gagner (Coming off an entry level contract with a cap hit of $1.65 million): Re-sign, obviously - he's 20 years old and has scored 131 NHL points. He's already one of the Oilers' top offensive players (that's called "damnation by faint praise", kids), and shows promise of improving. I would look for a long-term contract, but there's every chance he wouldn't go for that for any reasonable amount. In any event, for next season I'm budgeting a cap hit of $3 million, which might be way off in either direction, but is my best guess (that's called "damnation by faint praise", kids).
Andrew Cogliano (Coming off an entry level contract with a cap hit of $1.133 million): Re-sign. He's coming off a terrible year, which means that his trade value is low and he should be cheap to sign to a one year contract. Plus, he'll have something to prove next year, if you're into intangibles. It's well documented that he benefited from some unreasonably good luck in his first two seasons, and he probably won't score 45 points like he did in his rookie season, but I'll bet he gets more than 28. And after another year played on a one year contract, the worst case scenario is that the Oilers are in the same situation as they are now: having to decide what to do with an impending unrestricted free agent with low trade value. Best case scenario, they have a choice between giving him a big raise or trading him for actual value. After his season, you'd think Cogliano would accept his qualifying offer, but because of the bonuses on his entry level contract doing so would mean a de facto pay cut, so I'm budgeting the generous sum of $1.2 million.
Marc Pouliot (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $825 thousand): Re-sign. Lowetide called him a "perennial prospect", which is about right. Somehow, without my having noticed, Pouliot has spent parts of five seasons in the NHL, playing 176 games. It's worrying that he still hasn't established himself as an NHL player, but he's had injury trouble (this year it was, in Pat Quinn's words, a "pubis thing") and has shown progress. Of the Oilers' prospects (perennial or otherwise), I see Pouliot as the best hope to evolve into that elusive checking centre, so I say keep him. I'm budgeting $1 million for him, probably on a short deal (his upside isn't great enough to lock him in).
Gilbert Brule (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $800 thousand): Trade. He's coming off an excellent year, but he did it on a team where he was getting plenty of icetime with good linemates, since the Oilers weren't exactly flush with alternatives. That, his history, and his abnormally high shooting percentage leave me with some doubt that he can replicate his year, let alone improve on it. While I could be wrong about that, I'd rather sell high than sign him to the kind of money he'll probably expect.
J-F Jacques (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $525 thousand): Trade or do not qualify. The following is an exhaustive list of Jacques' qualifications to be an NHL player: he's very big. He's accomplished nothing of note in 109 NHL games, and his bad back does not inspire confidence that another contract would work out well. I don't know if he has trade value; if he doesn't, the Oilers should just let him walk.
Ryan Potulny (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $595 thousand): Much like Brule, Potulny's coming off a good year which I think may be an aberration based on getting icetime better than he'd get on a real team. Like Brule, I think his next contract will be an overpay, and his trade value is as high now as it's likely to be.
Theo Peckham (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $600 thousand): Re-sign. He's the type of defenseman the Oilers need and he's looked good in most of his NHL action. I think the Oilers can afford to have one rookie defenseman, and Peckham's my pick; it's not as though there are many other contenders. I'm budgeting $800 thousand for a short-term contract.
Jeff Drouin-Deslauriers (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $625 thousand): Trade or send to the minors (effectively waiving him). There isn't room for Drouin-Deslauriers and Devan Dubnyk on the Oilers next year, and while Drouin-Deslauriers' numbers were better, Dubnyk is younger, has less NHL experience, and looked to be improving as the year wore on. I suspect that there's no trade market for Drouin-Deslauriers, in which case we should send him to the minors; the worst case scenario is that somebody picks him up on waivers, and that would be no disaster.
Devan Dubnyk (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $700 thousand): Re-sign. If the Oilers were looking to compete this year, I'd suggest getting an established NHL backup, but since they're not they can afford to continue developing Dubnyk. I'm budgeting $1 million short-term, which he should be grateful to get since Oklahoma but for the grace of me goes he.
I'm proposing to re-sign three forwards, one defenseman, and one goalie at a total cap hit of $7 million. That brings our total roster so far to eight forwards, four defensemen, and two goalies at a cap hit of $35.575 million.
Impending unrestricted free agents
The Oilers have five pending unrestricted free agents, all of whom are sufficiently middling that they shouldn't be the subjects of bidding wars; accordingly, I'm assuming that all would be willing to re-sign for a reasonable price.
Fernando Pisani (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $2.5 million): Re-sign. Okay, maybe I'm being sentimental, but did you know he's one of only three Oilers remaining from the 2006 Cup run? When he's healthy, he's still a competent checker, of which the Oilers need more; assuming he'd take a massive pay cut (when he signed this contract, he was not far removed from Conn Smythe consideration; now, he's scored 23 points in the last two seasons combined) I'd bring him back. I have him at $1.2 million, but even that number might be...sentimental.
Mike Comrie (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $1.25 million): Re-sign. I'm a late convert to this cause, since the Oilers have too many small skill players, but since I'm proposing to eliminate O'Sullivan, Nilsson, and Brule, there may be room for Comrie. He had a pretty decent season when healthy, and can score goals without needing to be on the top line. Plus, Hilary Duff is probably the biggest celebrity ever to visit Edmonton for non-work reasons (not her work, at least). I have him getting $1.5 million.
Ryan Stone (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $600 thousand): Do not re-sign. Remember what I said above about Ryan Jones? "If he was an impending unrestricted free agent I'd shrug my shoulders and let him walk..."? Well that's Stone. He's fine as a fourth liner, but we have enough of those guys.
Jason Strudwick (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $700 thousand): Re-sign. He is not a good NHL defenseman, but he's apparently a great mentor to the younger players and one of the only veterans who crosses the age divide reportedly created by Moreau et al's highjinks. I'd platoon him with Peckham in the sixth spot, but if anybody in the top six went down for any period of time I'd bring in somebody else to slot ahead of Strudwick. $800 thousand should be plenty.
Aaron Johnson (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $540 thousand): Do not re-sign, probably. He's better than Strudwick, though not by all that much, but ideally there's only room for one of them on the team. If the Oilers can't fill out their blue line with players you'd like to see play 82 games, then Johnson can come back, but that's not ideal.
I'm proposing to re-sign two UFA forwards and one defenseman, at a total cap hit of $3.5 million. That brings the total roster to ten forwards, five defensemen, and two goalies, for a cap hit of $39.075 million.
Draft
Tyler Seguin: I don't actually have a strong opinion on who the Oilers should draft: on the one hand, Seguin's trending upwards while Hall isn't so much, and Seguin plays the more important position. On the other, Hall looks more NHL-ready now, and has put up results over a longer period of time. People in the know seem to think that Seguin's the more likely pick, so I'm going to assume it's him. Left to my own devices, I might not bring him into the NHL yet (to avoid getting the clock running on his entry level contract, if nothing else), but he's going to be the key PR piece on a team that will milk him for all he's worth, so it's a safe bet he'll be in Edmonton. I'm not really clear on what a player like that gets on an entry level contract once bonuses are considered, but I remember it being surprisingly high, so I'm just going to say $2.5 million.
Seguin brings the roster to eleven forwards, five defensemen, and two goalies, for a cap hit of $41.575 million.
The rest
This leaves three forwards and two defensemen. Some of those may come from within the system, as Jordan Eberle, Magnus Pääjärvi-Svensson, and Linus Omark are all threatening. I'm going to pencil one of them in (probably Eberle) at a cap hit of $1.625 (same as Gagner's entry level).
Some of the spots may be filled by trade: I'm proposing to trade Souray, Brule, and Potulny for sure, and Moreau, Drouin-Deslauriers, and Jacques if anybody will take them. For the most part, I'd rather take prospects (not NHL-ready prospects - there are quite enough of those on my roster already) and picks, and fill the remaining vacancies on the UFA market; in other words, I'd rather not add anything to the roster through trades. In Souray's case, that's probably not viable, as the Oilers will have to take a big contract back to make the trade work; Michal Roszival's a name I keep hearing, so we'll assume it's him or somebody like him: a defenseman with a cap hit of $5 million.
Our cap hit is up to $48.2 million, and we still need two forwards and one defenseman. That leaves us plenty of room to sign some good unrestricted free agents of Daryl Katz is okay spending to the cap without any intention of contending, but it seems more likely that these guys will be getting about $1.5 million each. For all three, I'd look for defensively responsible veterans on one year contracts. The forwards should include a centre who can play on the third or fourth line and maybe sit some games out if everything's working really well with Pouliot and Seguin; Matheson suggested Manny Malhotra, who's currently making $700 thousand in San Jose and probably won't re-sign there after the Sharks do their annual post-first round playoff defeat shuffling of the deck chairs (or he might - who knows what's going to happen in San Jose when Marleau's contract expires). Somebody like him would be good. For the other forward, I'd want a winger who can contribute a little offense - somebody like Pisani before his playoff performance made him unreasonably expensive. Those guys don't grow on trees, so we might need to settle for less. The defenseman should be somebody who likes to block shots with his face - like a Steve Staios or a Jason Smith when they were first acquired for the Oilers.
The resulting team isn't good. It's only got three players who indisputably belong on the top two lines, in Penner, Hemsky, and Gagner, but it's got a lot who can make forays: Horcoff, Seguin, Cogliano, Eberle, Comrie, and maybe one of the two unrestricted free agent signings if we're lucky. It would have sufficient checkers in Horcoff, Pisani, and those two unrestricted free agents.
Defense is a little better: Gilbert and Whitney would remain intact, and Smid and Roszival are probably both legitimate second pairing guys (not necessarily with each other - I'll leave the exact pairings to Tom Renney). If the UFA signing is a really good one, it could be a second pairing guy too; if not, he should at least a respectable third pairing with Peckham or Strudwick. Goal is a question mark, but that's inevitable if we're keeping Khabibulin.
The Oilers almost certainly don't make the playoffs with that lineup. What they do is develop kids at a respectable rate and finish the year with a pretty good draft pick and plenty of cap space (though Roszival would still be on the books for another year). The only key pieces who will need new contracts are Smid and possible Gagner (and maybe some other guys, if we're lucky enough to have them develop into key pieces). If the they show enough promise, and the team is sufficiently non-dysfunctional (or "functional), that unrestricted free agents don't stay away in droves, they should be able to add the necessary pieces to make the playoffs in 2011-2012.
My one rule is that I've tried to limit my options to things that the Oilers actually might do; with that in mind, while I think the they should jettison Khabibulin however they can, that's definitely not going to happen, so I'm leaving him in as the starting goalie. I'm also trying to avoid making the standard fan assumption that other teams are just itching to give us great players signed to value contracts in exchange for our flotsam; similarly, I'm trying to make realistic estimates of contract numbers. I might not be very good at either one, since I have no idea what I'm talking about, but I'm trying.
With that in mind, here's what I'd do if my last name were Tambellini.
Players under contract
Of players who could conceivably start next season in the NHL, fourteen are currently under contract with the Oilers next year. Like everybody else who played for the Oilers this year, they're a bunch of bums, but we can't get rid of all of them (or so I'm told), so we should figure out who we're keeping.
Shawn Horcoff (Signed through 2014-2015 at a cap hit of $5.5 million): Keep. The Oilers are not deep in defensively competent centres (please do not quote Horcoff's plus/minus unless you're prepared to also cite the underlying statistics), and Horcoff's contract is probably too big, and his 2009-2010 season too bad, to move. I actually don't think the contract is that bad: he was victimized this season by terrible linemates and some bad luck, and if he stays healthy, gets decent linemates, and stops being expected to do everything himself next year I think he either breaks 50 points or acts as an elite shutdown centre; $5.5 million's a lot for a guy in either of those roles, but it looks a lot better than paying $5.5 million for 36 points and a pile of goals against.
Dustin Penner (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $4.25 million): Keep, obviously. The only argument for trading him is if you think the Oilers have no chance of being competitive by 2011-2012, and I think that's premature. Plus, who knows? He might actually re-sign.
Ales Hemsky (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $4.1 million): Keep. Everything I said about Penner goes double for Hemsky (well, at least single).
Patrick O'Sullivan (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2.95 million): Buy out. I liked the trade that brought him in, but I was plainly wrong to do so. While it's unlikely that he could be traded, he's young enough that the buy out rules are very favourable.
Robert Nilsson (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2 million): Buy out. Everything I said about O'Sullivan also applies to Nilsson, except for the part about liking the trade that brought him here.
Ethan Moreau (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $2 million): Trade our buy out. Nobody would take him at the trade deadline, so buy out might be the only realistic option (Jim Matheson says that the Oilers will do it, too), though his play did improve after the deadline. He's been the captain of what has by all accounts become an extremely dysfunctional team, and if the way he plays with the young guys (refusing to pass to them, taking offensive zone penalties to hamper their scoring chances) is any indication of the way he interacts with them off the ice, I don't want him anywhere near them.
Ryan Jones (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $0.975 thousand): Keep. If he was an impending unrestricted free agent I'd shrug my shoulders and let him walk, but he's big, can play some, and is under contract. I expect he'd spend the season on the fourth line and the press box, but you're not going to fill your roster with world-beaters.
Zach Stortini (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $700 thousand): Keep. He's cheap and he's a perfectly acceptable fourth liner (and still improving some, by my eye).
Sheldon Souray (Signed through 2011-2012 at a cap hit of $5.4 million): Trade, obviously. I don't like doing it, because I have to think that we'll be taking back somebody even more overpaid than him, but he obviously has to go and a trade is the only realistic way of getting rid of him.
Tom Gilbert (Signed through 2013-2014 at a cap hit of $4 million): Keep. He and Whitney have the look of a legitimate top pairing, the Oilers are very short on legitimate NHL defenseman who haven't demanded to be traded, and Gilbert's trade value is suppressed at the moment by a season in which he didn't score much. In view of all that, there really isn't an argument for trading him.
Ryan Whitney (Signed through 2012-2013 at a cap hit of $4 million): Keep, for the same reasons as Gilbert, minus the suppressed trade value.
Ladislav Smid (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $1.3 million): Keep, for all the same reasons as Whitney, plus his could prove one of the best value contracts this year.
Taylor Chorney (Signed through 2010-2011 at a cap hit of $942 thousand): Send him to the minors. I don't think he'd have to clear waivers, and he's not ready for the NHL (no shame in that, as defensemen are notoriously slow to develop). He's also a soft, offense-first defenseman on a team that badly needs somebody more like Andy Sutton.
Nikolai Khabibulin (Signed through 2012-2013 at a cap hit of $3.75 million): Keep, regretfully. He's old, overpaid, overrated, and facing drunk driving charges, but the Oilers have decided that he's their starting goalie, so there's not much point in arguing.
In summary, I'm proposing to keep five forwards, three defensemen, and one goalie at a total cap hit of $28.575 million. I'm not factoring in buy out effects because I'm too lazy to check what they are; apparently they're negligible, though, at least for O'Sullivan and Nilsson.
Restricted free agents
Of players who could realistically start 2010-2011 in the NHL, the Oilers have nine impending restricted free agents. Here's how I'd handle them.
Sam Gagner (Coming off an entry level contract with a cap hit of $1.65 million): Re-sign, obviously - he's 20 years old and has scored 131 NHL points. He's already one of the Oilers' top offensive players (that's called "damnation by faint praise", kids), and shows promise of improving. I would look for a long-term contract, but there's every chance he wouldn't go for that for any reasonable amount. In any event, for next season I'm budgeting a cap hit of $3 million, which might be way off in either direction, but is my best guess (that's called "damnation by faint praise", kids).
Andrew Cogliano (Coming off an entry level contract with a cap hit of $1.133 million): Re-sign. He's coming off a terrible year, which means that his trade value is low and he should be cheap to sign to a one year contract. Plus, he'll have something to prove next year, if you're into intangibles. It's well documented that he benefited from some unreasonably good luck in his first two seasons, and he probably won't score 45 points like he did in his rookie season, but I'll bet he gets more than 28. And after another year played on a one year contract, the worst case scenario is that the Oilers are in the same situation as they are now: having to decide what to do with an impending unrestricted free agent with low trade value. Best case scenario, they have a choice between giving him a big raise or trading him for actual value. After his season, you'd think Cogliano would accept his qualifying offer, but because of the bonuses on his entry level contract doing so would mean a de facto pay cut, so I'm budgeting the generous sum of $1.2 million.
Marc Pouliot (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $825 thousand): Re-sign. Lowetide called him a "perennial prospect", which is about right. Somehow, without my having noticed, Pouliot has spent parts of five seasons in the NHL, playing 176 games. It's worrying that he still hasn't established himself as an NHL player, but he's had injury trouble (this year it was, in Pat Quinn's words, a "pubis thing") and has shown progress. Of the Oilers' prospects (perennial or otherwise), I see Pouliot as the best hope to evolve into that elusive checking centre, so I say keep him. I'm budgeting $1 million for him, probably on a short deal (his upside isn't great enough to lock him in).
Gilbert Brule (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $800 thousand): Trade. He's coming off an excellent year, but he did it on a team where he was getting plenty of icetime with good linemates, since the Oilers weren't exactly flush with alternatives. That, his history, and his abnormally high shooting percentage leave me with some doubt that he can replicate his year, let alone improve on it. While I could be wrong about that, I'd rather sell high than sign him to the kind of money he'll probably expect.
J-F Jacques (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $525 thousand): Trade or do not qualify. The following is an exhaustive list of Jacques' qualifications to be an NHL player: he's very big. He's accomplished nothing of note in 109 NHL games, and his bad back does not inspire confidence that another contract would work out well. I don't know if he has trade value; if he doesn't, the Oilers should just let him walk.
Ryan Potulny (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $595 thousand): Much like Brule, Potulny's coming off a good year which I think may be an aberration based on getting icetime better than he'd get on a real team. Like Brule, I think his next contract will be an overpay, and his trade value is as high now as it's likely to be.
Theo Peckham (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $600 thousand): Re-sign. He's the type of defenseman the Oilers need and he's looked good in most of his NHL action. I think the Oilers can afford to have one rookie defenseman, and Peckham's my pick; it's not as though there are many other contenders. I'm budgeting $800 thousand for a short-term contract.
Jeff Drouin-Deslauriers (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $625 thousand): Trade or send to the minors (effectively waiving him). There isn't room for Drouin-Deslauriers and Devan Dubnyk on the Oilers next year, and while Drouin-Deslauriers' numbers were better, Dubnyk is younger, has less NHL experience, and looked to be improving as the year wore on. I suspect that there's no trade market for Drouin-Deslauriers, in which case we should send him to the minors; the worst case scenario is that somebody picks him up on waivers, and that would be no disaster.
Devan Dubnyk (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $700 thousand): Re-sign. If the Oilers were looking to compete this year, I'd suggest getting an established NHL backup, but since they're not they can afford to continue developing Dubnyk. I'm budgeting $1 million short-term, which he should be grateful to get since Oklahoma but for the grace of me goes he.
I'm proposing to re-sign three forwards, one defenseman, and one goalie at a total cap hit of $7 million. That brings our total roster so far to eight forwards, four defensemen, and two goalies at a cap hit of $35.575 million.
Impending unrestricted free agents
The Oilers have five pending unrestricted free agents, all of whom are sufficiently middling that they shouldn't be the subjects of bidding wars; accordingly, I'm assuming that all would be willing to re-sign for a reasonable price.
Fernando Pisani (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $2.5 million): Re-sign. Okay, maybe I'm being sentimental, but did you know he's one of only three Oilers remaining from the 2006 Cup run? When he's healthy, he's still a competent checker, of which the Oilers need more; assuming he'd take a massive pay cut (when he signed this contract, he was not far removed from Conn Smythe consideration; now, he's scored 23 points in the last two seasons combined) I'd bring him back. I have him at $1.2 million, but even that number might be...sentimental.
Mike Comrie (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $1.25 million): Re-sign. I'm a late convert to this cause, since the Oilers have too many small skill players, but since I'm proposing to eliminate O'Sullivan, Nilsson, and Brule, there may be room for Comrie. He had a pretty decent season when healthy, and can score goals without needing to be on the top line. Plus, Hilary Duff is probably the biggest celebrity ever to visit Edmonton for non-work reasons (not her work, at least). I have him getting $1.5 million.
Ryan Stone (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $600 thousand): Do not re-sign. Remember what I said above about Ryan Jones? "If he was an impending unrestricted free agent I'd shrug my shoulders and let him walk..."? Well that's Stone. He's fine as a fourth liner, but we have enough of those guys.
Jason Strudwick (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $700 thousand): Re-sign. He is not a good NHL defenseman, but he's apparently a great mentor to the younger players and one of the only veterans who crosses the age divide reportedly created by Moreau et al's highjinks. I'd platoon him with Peckham in the sixth spot, but if anybody in the top six went down for any period of time I'd bring in somebody else to slot ahead of Strudwick. $800 thousand should be plenty.
Aaron Johnson (Coming off a contract with a cap hit of $540 thousand): Do not re-sign, probably. He's better than Strudwick, though not by all that much, but ideally there's only room for one of them on the team. If the Oilers can't fill out their blue line with players you'd like to see play 82 games, then Johnson can come back, but that's not ideal.
I'm proposing to re-sign two UFA forwards and one defenseman, at a total cap hit of $3.5 million. That brings the total roster to ten forwards, five defensemen, and two goalies, for a cap hit of $39.075 million.
Draft
Tyler Seguin: I don't actually have a strong opinion on who the Oilers should draft: on the one hand, Seguin's trending upwards while Hall isn't so much, and Seguin plays the more important position. On the other, Hall looks more NHL-ready now, and has put up results over a longer period of time. People in the know seem to think that Seguin's the more likely pick, so I'm going to assume it's him. Left to my own devices, I might not bring him into the NHL yet (to avoid getting the clock running on his entry level contract, if nothing else), but he's going to be the key PR piece on a team that will milk him for all he's worth, so it's a safe bet he'll be in Edmonton. I'm not really clear on what a player like that gets on an entry level contract once bonuses are considered, but I remember it being surprisingly high, so I'm just going to say $2.5 million.
Seguin brings the roster to eleven forwards, five defensemen, and two goalies, for a cap hit of $41.575 million.
The rest
This leaves three forwards and two defensemen. Some of those may come from within the system, as Jordan Eberle, Magnus Pääjärvi-Svensson, and Linus Omark are all threatening. I'm going to pencil one of them in (probably Eberle) at a cap hit of $1.625 (same as Gagner's entry level).
Some of the spots may be filled by trade: I'm proposing to trade Souray, Brule, and Potulny for sure, and Moreau, Drouin-Deslauriers, and Jacques if anybody will take them. For the most part, I'd rather take prospects (not NHL-ready prospects - there are quite enough of those on my roster already) and picks, and fill the remaining vacancies on the UFA market; in other words, I'd rather not add anything to the roster through trades. In Souray's case, that's probably not viable, as the Oilers will have to take a big contract back to make the trade work; Michal Roszival's a name I keep hearing, so we'll assume it's him or somebody like him: a defenseman with a cap hit of $5 million.
Our cap hit is up to $48.2 million, and we still need two forwards and one defenseman. That leaves us plenty of room to sign some good unrestricted free agents of Daryl Katz is okay spending to the cap without any intention of contending, but it seems more likely that these guys will be getting about $1.5 million each. For all three, I'd look for defensively responsible veterans on one year contracts. The forwards should include a centre who can play on the third or fourth line and maybe sit some games out if everything's working really well with Pouliot and Seguin; Matheson suggested Manny Malhotra, who's currently making $700 thousand in San Jose and probably won't re-sign there after the Sharks do their annual post-first round playoff defeat shuffling of the deck chairs (or he might - who knows what's going to happen in San Jose when Marleau's contract expires). Somebody like him would be good. For the other forward, I'd want a winger who can contribute a little offense - somebody like Pisani before his playoff performance made him unreasonably expensive. Those guys don't grow on trees, so we might need to settle for less. The defenseman should be somebody who likes to block shots with his face - like a Steve Staios or a Jason Smith when they were first acquired for the Oilers.
The resulting team isn't good. It's only got three players who indisputably belong on the top two lines, in Penner, Hemsky, and Gagner, but it's got a lot who can make forays: Horcoff, Seguin, Cogliano, Eberle, Comrie, and maybe one of the two unrestricted free agent signings if we're lucky. It would have sufficient checkers in Horcoff, Pisani, and those two unrestricted free agents.
Defense is a little better: Gilbert and Whitney would remain intact, and Smid and Roszival are probably both legitimate second pairing guys (not necessarily with each other - I'll leave the exact pairings to Tom Renney). If the UFA signing is a really good one, it could be a second pairing guy too; if not, he should at least a respectable third pairing with Peckham or Strudwick. Goal is a question mark, but that's inevitable if we're keeping Khabibulin.
The Oilers almost certainly don't make the playoffs with that lineup. What they do is develop kids at a respectable rate and finish the year with a pretty good draft pick and plenty of cap space (though Roszival would still be on the books for another year). The only key pieces who will need new contracts are Smid and possible Gagner (and maybe some other guys, if we're lucky enough to have them develop into key pieces). If the they show enough promise, and the team is sufficiently non-dysfunctional (or "functional), that unrestricted free agents don't stay away in droves, they should be able to add the necessary pieces to make the playoffs in 2011-2012.
Friday, December 11, 2009
It wasn't supposed to be like this!
Pity David Swann. The Calgary MD - by all accounts a model of decency and integrity - took over the Alberta Liberal Party in the wake of one of its periodic shellackings at the hands of the Progressive Conservatives. Now, barely two years later, there's evidence that the criticisms his party has been throwing at the government since it became official opposition sixteen years ago are finally starting to stick: the Liberals are tied with Ed Stelmach's governing P.C.s, and ahead of them in both Calgary and Edmonton. Not even the most optimistic prognosticators would have predicted this two years ago.
The bad news? Well...
The bad news? Well...
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Dept. of the World's Least Terrifying Bogeymen
Stelmach: voting for the WRA will benefit the Liberals.
Pop quiz: in how many Conservative-won ridings was the Liberal vote at least half of the combined Conservative/WRA vote (i.e. the minimum number that could possibly result in a Conservative/WRA vote split electing a Liberal) in the last election?
Answer: 22
How many of those were outside of Edmonton and Calgary?
Answer: 4. And three of those were St. Albert, Medicine Hat, and Lethbridge West.
So if 100% of the WRA's growth in the next election comes from the P.C.s (a dubious proposition, given the number of voters inclined to vote for the strongest available opposition party, especially in Calgary's current political climate),
and if voting patterns in the last election are a good indicator of voting patterns in the next election,
and if the PC-WRA vote is split in each riding in exactly the way that most benefits the Liberals,
then the Liberals will 31 seats in the next election. That's nearly half of what the P.C.s won in the last one!
Terrifying.
Pop quiz: in how many Conservative-won ridings was the Liberal vote at least half of the combined Conservative/WRA vote (i.e. the minimum number that could possibly result in a Conservative/WRA vote split electing a Liberal) in the last election?
Answer: 22
How many of those were outside of Edmonton and Calgary?
Answer: 4. And three of those were St. Albert, Medicine Hat, and Lethbridge West.
So if 100% of the WRA's growth in the next election comes from the P.C.s (a dubious proposition, given the number of voters inclined to vote for the strongest available opposition party, especially in Calgary's current political climate),
and if voting patterns in the last election are a good indicator of voting patterns in the next election,
and if the PC-WRA vote is split in each riding in exactly the way that most benefits the Liberals,
then the Liberals will 31 seats in the next election. That's nearly half of what the P.C.s won in the last one!
Terrifying.
Monday, October 12, 2009
Geez, am I ever out of touch
I didn't even know he was running. But I pretty much reflexively support any candidate who promises to raise taxes, so I wish he'd have stuck around.
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Restrain your equines
Before we get too excited about this business of the Wildrose Alliance being the natural successor to the United Farmers of Alberta, Social Credit League, and Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta - parties that came seemingly out of nowhere to topples Alberta dynasties - there are a few things worth remembering:
1. This isn't the first time the Wildrose Alliance has had a seat. Hell, it isn't the first time Paul Hinman's had a seat. He won one in the 2004 election, granted under the banner of the Alberta Alliance rather than the Wildrose Alliance (though the label changed part way through the term, once the Alberta Alliance merged with the Wildrose Party). That was hailed as a brave new threat to the Klein Conservatives on the right. The Alliance had secured a foothold, said conventional wisdom, and the next election might be like 1967, when Peter Lougheed led the hitherto moribund Tories to winning a shocking six seats from the unassailable Ernest Manning. And then 2008 rolled around. The breakthrough did not come. In fact, Hinman lost his seat.
This situation can be distinguished from the last one on a few bases: in 2008, there was a strong feeling of "give Ed a chance", while the sense now is that he's worn out his welcome in a few short years. In 2004, Hinman eked out a narrow victory over Conservative incumbent Bryce Jacobs; in 2009, Hinman blew the Conservative out of the water. 2004's victory was in a rural riding; 2009's was in an urban one, exactly where the WRA wasn't supposed to make inroads. So there are signs that something is indeed happening here, but we ought perhaps to be slightly more deferential to Stephen Stills in evaluating what it is.
2. This isn't the first time a surprising by-election result has been seen as a portent of shocking things on the horizon. In 2007, Liberal Craig Cheffins' victory in Klein's Calgary-Elbow seat was seen as a sign of an imminent Liberal breakthrough in Calgary. In 2008, the Conservatives continued their dominance of the city, including Calgary-Elbow. In 1982, Gordon Kesler of the separatist Western Canada Concept won an Olds-Didsbury by-election handily. That one attracted national attention, just as Hinman's has. Six months later, the WCC ran candidates in 78 of 79 ridings. All of them lost. Kesler's 1,400 by-election victory in Olds-Disbury turned into a 5,800 vote defeat in Highwood. Daryl Jaddock, his replacement as WCC candidate in Olds-Didsbury, lost by 2,300 votes. While conventional wisdom is trumpeting the significance of Hinman's victory, it might remember that it has always maintained, quite correctly, that by-elections are different beasts from general elections.
3. The Progressive Conservatives hold 72 of 83 seats. The Wildrose Alliance holds one. The Conservatives won 53% of the vote in 2008. The Wildrose Alliance won 7%, in what was supposed to be their breakthrough election (by comparison, the Conservatives got 20% in 1967, in what actually *was* their breakthrough election).
It's too early to predict with any accuracy what the 2012 (?) election will bring. But let's not go nuts in the meantime.
1. This isn't the first time the Wildrose Alliance has had a seat. Hell, it isn't the first time Paul Hinman's had a seat. He won one in the 2004 election, granted under the banner of the Alberta Alliance rather than the Wildrose Alliance (though the label changed part way through the term, once the Alberta Alliance merged with the Wildrose Party). That was hailed as a brave new threat to the Klein Conservatives on the right. The Alliance had secured a foothold, said conventional wisdom, and the next election might be like 1967, when Peter Lougheed led the hitherto moribund Tories to winning a shocking six seats from the unassailable Ernest Manning. And then 2008 rolled around. The breakthrough did not come. In fact, Hinman lost his seat.
This situation can be distinguished from the last one on a few bases: in 2008, there was a strong feeling of "give Ed a chance", while the sense now is that he's worn out his welcome in a few short years. In 2004, Hinman eked out a narrow victory over Conservative incumbent Bryce Jacobs; in 2009, Hinman blew the Conservative out of the water. 2004's victory was in a rural riding; 2009's was in an urban one, exactly where the WRA wasn't supposed to make inroads. So there are signs that something is indeed happening here, but we ought perhaps to be slightly more deferential to Stephen Stills in evaluating what it is.
2. This isn't the first time a surprising by-election result has been seen as a portent of shocking things on the horizon. In 2007, Liberal Craig Cheffins' victory in Klein's Calgary-Elbow seat was seen as a sign of an imminent Liberal breakthrough in Calgary. In 2008, the Conservatives continued their dominance of the city, including Calgary-Elbow. In 1982, Gordon Kesler of the separatist Western Canada Concept won an Olds-Didsbury by-election handily. That one attracted national attention, just as Hinman's has. Six months later, the WCC ran candidates in 78 of 79 ridings. All of them lost. Kesler's 1,400 by-election victory in Olds-Disbury turned into a 5,800 vote defeat in Highwood. Daryl Jaddock, his replacement as WCC candidate in Olds-Didsbury, lost by 2,300 votes. While conventional wisdom is trumpeting the significance of Hinman's victory, it might remember that it has always maintained, quite correctly, that by-elections are different beasts from general elections.
3. The Progressive Conservatives hold 72 of 83 seats. The Wildrose Alliance holds one. The Conservatives won 53% of the vote in 2008. The Wildrose Alliance won 7%, in what was supposed to be their breakthrough election (by comparison, the Conservatives got 20% in 1967, in what actually *was* their breakthrough election).
It's too early to predict with any accuracy what the 2012 (?) election will bring. But let's not go nuts in the meantime.
Monday, September 14, 2009
On minority governments and contradictory first principles
This current fuss about a possible early election, like so many fusses, can be blamed primarily on the fact that nobody except me understands Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
Here are a couple of things that I think we can probably all agree MPs should strive for during minority parliaments:
1. Adhering to something approximating the platform that got them elected, and
2. Avoiding unnecessarily frequent elections (four elections in five years probably qualifying as unnecessarily frequent).
Does that make sense? I think that makes sense. We'll call these first principles against which MPs' performance must be evaluated.
How have the current MPs been doing? Well, the Conservatives have been doing very well: they've been able to pass the legislation they want (though you can quibble about how closely that resembles what they were elected on) without having had to make many compromises with opposition parties. They've never voted to defeat the government, and their leader has never asked for Parliament to be dissolved, so they're certainly not trying to trigger an election.
And the opposition parties? Well, since all opposition MPs (unless we're going to broaden the term to include Andre Arthur) ran on platforms quite inconsistent with what the government's been up to, the only way to adhere to principle 1 is to vote against the government, including on confidence motions. So far, the NDP and the Bloc have done quite well at this (though the NDP shows signs of caving). The Liberals, not quite so much (though they show signs of changing this as well). Of course, voting against the government on a confidence vote seems likely to result in an election, which means that the NDP and the Bloc have been failing pretty lamentably at principle 2. In fact, it appears to be impossible to adhere to both principles, as long as the Conservatives show little interest in putting forward legislation consistent with the opposition parties' platforms (and indeed, why should they? They're doing just fine without needing to do that, and doing so would necessarily hurt their own principle 1 performance).
If that was the case, the Westminster parliamentary system would appear to be a pretty lousy way to govern a country. Along those lines, the Globe and Mail recently asked Is Canada Broken?. While, axiomatically speaking, the question deserves a stupid answer, I'll try to give it a good one: no. While I'm no great believer in the Westminster system, it's not so flawed that it provides no solution to situations like this one, and the opposition parties, no dummies, realized it when, in late 2008, they proposed making Stephane Dion Prime Minister. Indeed, that proposal was about the only way they could adhere to both above-identified first principles.
Unfortunately, as it turns out (and, I take some pride in saying, as I predicted) many Canadians also hold a third first principle:
3. The leader of the party with the most seats in the House of Commons should be Prime Minister.
It's only that third principle that makes the situation untenable for the opposition parties (and enormously advantageous for the governing party). Voters who believe in it have no right to complain about a possible 2009 election.
Here are a couple of things that I think we can probably all agree MPs should strive for during minority parliaments:
1. Adhering to something approximating the platform that got them elected, and
2. Avoiding unnecessarily frequent elections (four elections in five years probably qualifying as unnecessarily frequent).
Does that make sense? I think that makes sense. We'll call these first principles against which MPs' performance must be evaluated.
How have the current MPs been doing? Well, the Conservatives have been doing very well: they've been able to pass the legislation they want (though you can quibble about how closely that resembles what they were elected on) without having had to make many compromises with opposition parties. They've never voted to defeat the government, and their leader has never asked for Parliament to be dissolved, so they're certainly not trying to trigger an election.
And the opposition parties? Well, since all opposition MPs (unless we're going to broaden the term to include Andre Arthur) ran on platforms quite inconsistent with what the government's been up to, the only way to adhere to principle 1 is to vote against the government, including on confidence motions. So far, the NDP and the Bloc have done quite well at this (though the NDP shows signs of caving). The Liberals, not quite so much (though they show signs of changing this as well). Of course, voting against the government on a confidence vote seems likely to result in an election, which means that the NDP and the Bloc have been failing pretty lamentably at principle 2. In fact, it appears to be impossible to adhere to both principles, as long as the Conservatives show little interest in putting forward legislation consistent with the opposition parties' platforms (and indeed, why should they? They're doing just fine without needing to do that, and doing so would necessarily hurt their own principle 1 performance).
If that was the case, the Westminster parliamentary system would appear to be a pretty lousy way to govern a country. Along those lines, the Globe and Mail recently asked Is Canada Broken?. While, axiomatically speaking, the question deserves a stupid answer, I'll try to give it a good one: no. While I'm no great believer in the Westminster system, it's not so flawed that it provides no solution to situations like this one, and the opposition parties, no dummies, realized it when, in late 2008, they proposed making Stephane Dion Prime Minister. Indeed, that proposal was about the only way they could adhere to both above-identified first principles.
Unfortunately, as it turns out (and, I take some pride in saying, as I predicted) many Canadians also hold a third first principle:
3. The leader of the party with the most seats in the House of Commons should be Prime Minister.
It's only that third principle that makes the situation untenable for the opposition parties (and enormously advantageous for the governing party). Voters who believe in it have no right to complain about a possible 2009 election.
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
History repeats itself, part 2 * pi
Ralph Klein used to be considered a nice guy.
I realize that this is a surprising thing to say about a man who's best remembered now for throwing change at the homeless, ridiculing recipients of Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped, making lewd jokes about female cabinet ministers, and hunting nuns for sport, but it's true. When he was running for P.C. leader, the concern -- along with the concern that he couldn't make morning meetings -- was that he was too nice a guy, too inclined to be everybody's (drinking) buddy.
Observers became convinced that Klein had the backbone for the job only after three incidents early in his premiership: in 1994 he fired Deputy Premier Ken Kowalski for being a power unto himself and Transportation Minister Peter Trynchy for some questionable business dealings, and in 1996 he fired Social Services Minister Mike Cardinal for mixing the personal and the political unduly. All three were difficult firings: Kowalski was a cabinet heavyweight and an important power-broker, Trynchy was the longest-serving MLA in the province (the last remnant of Peter Lougheed's class of 1971), and Mike Cardinal was close to Klein both personally and politically. But he fired all three unilaterally, and he ruled his caucus from an iron fist from that point until the point several years later at which he started to completely lose his mind.
Ed Stelmach's ascendancy to the P.C. leadership took place the same month as Stephane Dion's to the federal Liberal leadership, and comparisons between the two were inevitable. Both were seen as nice guys whose wins were largely accidental, the product of voting systems that hurt their more popular, but also more polarizing, opponents. Stephane Dion, who I quite liked at the time and for whom I retain a good deal of admiration provided when I evaluate him on the basis of sufficiently carefully selected criteria, quickly went about reinforcing that impression. Stelmach sort of seemed to too.
Guy Boutilier is no Ken Kowalski, but Ed Stelmach has served notice that he's not fucking around. The only question is whether we as Albertans will mark it eight, or zero?
I realize that this is a surprising thing to say about a man who's best remembered now for throwing change at the homeless, ridiculing recipients of Assured Income for the Severely Handicapped, making lewd jokes about female cabinet ministers, and hunting nuns for sport, but it's true. When he was running for P.C. leader, the concern -- along with the concern that he couldn't make morning meetings -- was that he was too nice a guy, too inclined to be everybody's (drinking) buddy.
Observers became convinced that Klein had the backbone for the job only after three incidents early in his premiership: in 1994 he fired Deputy Premier Ken Kowalski for being a power unto himself and Transportation Minister Peter Trynchy for some questionable business dealings, and in 1996 he fired Social Services Minister Mike Cardinal for mixing the personal and the political unduly. All three were difficult firings: Kowalski was a cabinet heavyweight and an important power-broker, Trynchy was the longest-serving MLA in the province (the last remnant of Peter Lougheed's class of 1971), and Mike Cardinal was close to Klein both personally and politically. But he fired all three unilaterally, and he ruled his caucus from an iron fist from that point until the point several years later at which he started to completely lose his mind.
Ed Stelmach's ascendancy to the P.C. leadership took place the same month as Stephane Dion's to the federal Liberal leadership, and comparisons between the two were inevitable. Both were seen as nice guys whose wins were largely accidental, the product of voting systems that hurt their more popular, but also more polarizing, opponents. Stephane Dion, who I quite liked at the time and for whom I retain a good deal of admiration provided when I evaluate him on the basis of sufficiently carefully selected criteria, quickly went about reinforcing that impression. Stelmach sort of seemed to too.
Guy Boutilier is no Ken Kowalski, but Ed Stelmach has served notice that he's not fucking around. The only question is whether we as Albertans will mark it eight, or zero?
Tuesday, June 23, 2009
My party can dehumanize criminals just as much as your party can, part 857
"We supported all of [the Conservative] crime legislation so I don't understand on what basis they would be [accusing the Liberals of being soft on crime] now, other than that it's their default knee-jerk position when it comes to the Liberal Party and crime."
- Jill Fairbrother, Liberal spokestype
And to how many of those pieces of legislation did the Liberals move amendments making it legal to shoot graffiti artists for sport? Yeah, that's what I thought. Softies.
- Jill Fairbrother, Liberal spokestype
And to how many of those pieces of legislation did the Liberals move amendments making it legal to shoot graffiti artists for sport? Yeah, that's what I thought. Softies.
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Friday, April 24, 2009
Disconnect
I pride myself on being difficult to pigeonhole politically; my limited but deeply-felt disagreements with the NDP and my even more limited but similarly deeply-felt agreements with the Conservatives help convince me that I'm able to consider issues on their merits rather than solely on my bedfellow preferences.
But sometimes I still feel ill at ease when I lift my head from the pillow to see who's next to me, and at no time is that more true than when other side of the bed is being occupied by an Edmonton Sun opinion writer.
I've written about my discomfort with my Afghanistan position before (most recently here), and I don't have much more to say. I'm painfully aware that I'm commenting from an privileged position (there are people - Afghanis and foreigners - dying over there, none of whom are me), and I'm not at all sure that history will vindicate my position. I'm also frustrated by the sparse data available; indeed, the only evidence Mr. Den Tandt cites in support of his assertion that Canadian troops are improving the country are the words of an American general whose job requires him to say nice things about i. the mission, and ii. Canada's role in it.
But I continue to believe that the west had a legitimate national security rationale for violating Afghanistan's sovereignty in 2001 (apart from any humanitarian rationale that may have existed). And the evidence that I've seen - and I cast a pretty wide net in my search for evidence, in diversity if not in volume - continues to support the belief that Canada is doing some good there, even if "victory" is a concept that has lost any meaning that it may once have had. Is it possible that the cost of the mission, in lives, isn't worth the good that it's doing? Sure. And I'm more than prepared to accept that elements of the mission were misconceived, and that it's hitting the wrong combination of development, reconstruction, and security, or that its resources just aren't sufficient to do a proper job of any of those.
But what about those women? A couple of years ago, I heard Sima Samar, then the recently-resigned Deputy President and Minister of Women's Affairs of Afghanistan (part of my aforementioned net-casting). The crowd at the talk was decidedly lefty. And Samar did not disappoint, with a litany of criticisms of the west in its approach to Afghanistan. But in response to questioner after questioner seeking her endorsement for the concept of an immediate withdrawal, she emphatically endorsed a continued Canadian military presence. She was obviously frustrated by the state of women's rights in Afghanistan (and I've not seen much since to suggest that it's gotten any better), but her message was clear: things would get a whole lot worse of the international community ended its military occupation.
My tentative support for the mission is in its seventh year. Is my position the correct one? I don't know. But I'm confident that an awful lot of the positions opposed to mine are the incorrect ones, even if that confidence puts me on the same page as Sun columnists.
But sometimes I still feel ill at ease when I lift my head from the pillow to see who's next to me, and at no time is that more true than when other side of the bed is being occupied by an Edmonton Sun opinion writer.
I've written about my discomfort with my Afghanistan position before (most recently here), and I don't have much more to say. I'm painfully aware that I'm commenting from an privileged position (there are people - Afghanis and foreigners - dying over there, none of whom are me), and I'm not at all sure that history will vindicate my position. I'm also frustrated by the sparse data available; indeed, the only evidence Mr. Den Tandt cites in support of his assertion that Canadian troops are improving the country are the words of an American general whose job requires him to say nice things about i. the mission, and ii. Canada's role in it.
But I continue to believe that the west had a legitimate national security rationale for violating Afghanistan's sovereignty in 2001 (apart from any humanitarian rationale that may have existed). And the evidence that I've seen - and I cast a pretty wide net in my search for evidence, in diversity if not in volume - continues to support the belief that Canada is doing some good there, even if "victory" is a concept that has lost any meaning that it may once have had. Is it possible that the cost of the mission, in lives, isn't worth the good that it's doing? Sure. And I'm more than prepared to accept that elements of the mission were misconceived, and that it's hitting the wrong combination of development, reconstruction, and security, or that its resources just aren't sufficient to do a proper job of any of those.
But what about those women? A couple of years ago, I heard Sima Samar, then the recently-resigned Deputy President and Minister of Women's Affairs of Afghanistan (part of my aforementioned net-casting). The crowd at the talk was decidedly lefty. And Samar did not disappoint, with a litany of criticisms of the west in its approach to Afghanistan. But in response to questioner after questioner seeking her endorsement for the concept of an immediate withdrawal, she emphatically endorsed a continued Canadian military presence. She was obviously frustrated by the state of women's rights in Afghanistan (and I've not seen much since to suggest that it's gotten any better), but her message was clear: things would get a whole lot worse of the international community ended its military occupation.
My tentative support for the mission is in its seventh year. Is my position the correct one? I don't know. But I'm confident that an awful lot of the positions opposed to mine are the incorrect ones, even if that confidence puts me on the same page as Sun columnists.
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Apocalypse nowabouts
Good loses seats in all cases. Evil gains seats in all cases. Evil fighting evil for Edmonton-Strathcona. Depressing night. Garth Turner loses. Possible coherence tomorrow.
Update: Further sign of the apocalypse: Paul Wells wrong. Dion has to go. If he'd broken, say, ninety seats, I would have said that he should stay on, for the reasons that Wells lists (especially the one about in effect having to prop the Conservatives up). But the defeat was just too thorough, and he is now so drenched in the stench of loserhood, that he will never win. Canadian voters, in their twisted little illogic, will continue to reject him because the fact that they have rejected him before proves that he should be rejected. In a just world, he'd fight another election on the Green Shift and win it. He won't. It isn't a just world.
Update: Further sign of the apocalypse: Paul Wells wrong. Dion has to go. If he'd broken, say, ninety seats, I would have said that he should stay on, for the reasons that Wells lists (especially the one about in effect having to prop the Conservatives up). But the defeat was just too thorough, and he is now so drenched in the stench of loserhood, that he will never win. Canadian voters, in their twisted little illogic, will continue to reject him because the fact that they have rejected him before proves that he should be rejected. In a just world, he'd fight another election on the Green Shift and win it. He won't. It isn't a just world.
Coyne collection
Things I didn't know until just now: apparently every prominent Canadian named "Coyne" is related. James Coyne is the father of Andrew Coyne (and also of actress Susan Coyne, who I've never heard of) and the uncle of Deborah Coyne (and therefore the great uncle of Sarah Coyne). Far out.
Monday, October 13, 2008
Fun facts, predictions, etc.
Here's an interesting fact: seven times in Canadian history, minority governments have gone into elections: 1926, 1958, 1963, 1965, 1974, 1980, and 2006. The mean lifespan of the minority governments in question was about sixteen and a half months. Six of those elections resolved the minority situation, either by throwing the government out or by giving it a majority. The two exceptions were 1963 and 1965, when incumbent Lester Pearson was as unable to win a majority as Diefenbaker was to take his old job back (interestingly, these two exceptions also comprise the longest minority governments in Canadian history - removing them, the average falls to less than a year).
While I'm leery of ascribing motivations to Canadian voters collectively (if they get together in advance of elections to decide what message they want to send and to coordinate their voting accordingly, as seems to be the belief of so much of the pundocracy, they've somehow forgotten to invite me), it seems reasonable to draw some conclusions from this: Canadians are not generally hesitant in their evaluations of minorities, and seem to dislike minority situations enough that they'll vote for stability, even after a relatively short trial period.
Which brings us to this election, which gives every indication of deciding absolutely nothing. At the beginning of the campaign, I predicted an increased Conservative minority, which still looks like it will be the case, but I was thinking something on the order of 145 seats. Now, it appears that they'll struggle to break 130. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that any party will see their seats change by more than ten in either direction from what they held at dissolution (in the net, the Liberals are likely to lose a handful of seats to the Conservatives and New Democrats).
I've played Prime Minister Forever, an election simulation game that's more fun than accurate, a few times. In it, each party is given a goal, which I suspect corresponds roughly to the parties' actual goals going into the campaign. Not a single one of the pan-Canadian parties is poised to reach its goal from the 2008 scenario.
Two questions emerge from this: first, when will the next election be? The popular money right now says "soon" (unless, as Lawrence Martin quite incorrectly suggested, there's some possibility of the Conservatives being replaced by either a Liberal minority or a coalition government without an intervening election), but the popular money isn't the smart money. In January of 2006, I bet no less a light than Edmonton City Councillor Don Iveson that there wouldn't be another federal election in 2006; to say that I won that bet would be understating it. I made that bet because minority Parliaments are, for their first couple of years especially, giant games of chicken, in which each party wants to appear to be taking bold action regardless of how it might play with opposing parties, but each party is also desperate to avoid being seen as responsible for a new election, and indeed desperate to avoid triggering such an election absent some indication that it will improve its standing in it. I don't pretend to know exactly how the Harper government will survive another two years or so, but it will find a way (or, more accurately, the opposition parties will find a way to allow it to). If the Liberals unwisely engage in another leadership campaign, it suddenly becomes pretty easy, but that's by no means a prerequisite.
Speaking of leadership campaigns, the second obvious question is, given that every federal leader (Gilles Duceppe doesn't count) will have failed to achieve his/her objective, who pays? Stephen Harper, in my view, is safe for at least the duration of this next government; his leadership brought the Conservatives to government from a place where it seemed an impossibility, and there aren't a lot of saviours waiting in the wings anyway. But he's the only one.
Elizabeth May is likely to be gone, unless she can win a seat in a by-election quickly. She probably could have had her pick of at least a dozen ridings winnable to her solely on the strength of her status as Green Party leader; she chose to run in a different one. The Greens will enter this post-election period in no better shape than they entered the last one, and responsibility for that is primarily May's. The Greens have already remained a viable national party for longer than anybody else has done so without winning a seat; one has to wonder if the ghost of Mel Hurtig will be beckoning for it soon.
Dion, too, will probably be ousted, though this would be a mistake. I believe that he has established himself as an alternative to Harper in the minds of enough Canadians that, if the Conservatives should falter early in their new government, the Liberals would be better off with him at the helm than with a vacuum (that faint praise wasn't intended to be quite that damning, but there you are). It would be easy to note that only the Liberals will win fewer seats than they did in 2006, but it would be more useful to compare their election day performance to their standing at dissolution than to their 2006 performance. By that comparison, I think Dion has the Liberals on the upswing. Besides that, his baggage has been checked; the same is not true of Rae and Ignatieff.
This leaves us with Jack Layton. On the one hand, he will (for the third consecutive election) increase the NDP seat count. On the other hand, the New Democrats were hoping for a breakthrough in Montreal and to at least challenge the Liberals for the title of Official Opposition. Neither will occur. It looks very much like the NDP is very close to its plateau under Layton and, for the first time in a while, there's an heir apparent in Thomas Mulcair. Back on the first hand, polls consistently show that Layton is (inexplicably) more popular than his party, and this is not a party that has historically been quick to turf underperforming leaders. My bet is that he'll stick around for a while as well.
All of that said, here are my predictions:
* Conservative: 130
* Liberal: 90
* Bloc: 51
* NDP: 35
* Independent: 2
While I'm leery of ascribing motivations to Canadian voters collectively (if they get together in advance of elections to decide what message they want to send and to coordinate their voting accordingly, as seems to be the belief of so much of the pundocracy, they've somehow forgotten to invite me), it seems reasonable to draw some conclusions from this: Canadians are not generally hesitant in their evaluations of minorities, and seem to dislike minority situations enough that they'll vote for stability, even after a relatively short trial period.
Which brings us to this election, which gives every indication of deciding absolutely nothing. At the beginning of the campaign, I predicted an increased Conservative minority, which still looks like it will be the case, but I was thinking something on the order of 145 seats. Now, it appears that they'll struggle to break 130. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that any party will see their seats change by more than ten in either direction from what they held at dissolution (in the net, the Liberals are likely to lose a handful of seats to the Conservatives and New Democrats).
I've played Prime Minister Forever, an election simulation game that's more fun than accurate, a few times. In it, each party is given a goal, which I suspect corresponds roughly to the parties' actual goals going into the campaign. Not a single one of the pan-Canadian parties is poised to reach its goal from the 2008 scenario.
Two questions emerge from this: first, when will the next election be? The popular money right now says "soon" (unless, as Lawrence Martin quite incorrectly suggested, there's some possibility of the Conservatives being replaced by either a Liberal minority or a coalition government without an intervening election), but the popular money isn't the smart money. In January of 2006, I bet no less a light than Edmonton City Councillor Don Iveson that there wouldn't be another federal election in 2006; to say that I won that bet would be understating it. I made that bet because minority Parliaments are, for their first couple of years especially, giant games of chicken, in which each party wants to appear to be taking bold action regardless of how it might play with opposing parties, but each party is also desperate to avoid being seen as responsible for a new election, and indeed desperate to avoid triggering such an election absent some indication that it will improve its standing in it. I don't pretend to know exactly how the Harper government will survive another two years or so, but it will find a way (or, more accurately, the opposition parties will find a way to allow it to). If the Liberals unwisely engage in another leadership campaign, it suddenly becomes pretty easy, but that's by no means a prerequisite.
Speaking of leadership campaigns, the second obvious question is, given that every federal leader (Gilles Duceppe doesn't count) will have failed to achieve his/her objective, who pays? Stephen Harper, in my view, is safe for at least the duration of this next government; his leadership brought the Conservatives to government from a place where it seemed an impossibility, and there aren't a lot of saviours waiting in the wings anyway. But he's the only one.
Elizabeth May is likely to be gone, unless she can win a seat in a by-election quickly. She probably could have had her pick of at least a dozen ridings winnable to her solely on the strength of her status as Green Party leader; she chose to run in a different one. The Greens will enter this post-election period in no better shape than they entered the last one, and responsibility for that is primarily May's. The Greens have already remained a viable national party for longer than anybody else has done so without winning a seat; one has to wonder if the ghost of Mel Hurtig will be beckoning for it soon.
Dion, too, will probably be ousted, though this would be a mistake. I believe that he has established himself as an alternative to Harper in the minds of enough Canadians that, if the Conservatives should falter early in their new government, the Liberals would be better off with him at the helm than with a vacuum (that faint praise wasn't intended to be quite that damning, but there you are). It would be easy to note that only the Liberals will win fewer seats than they did in 2006, but it would be more useful to compare their election day performance to their standing at dissolution than to their 2006 performance. By that comparison, I think Dion has the Liberals on the upswing. Besides that, his baggage has been checked; the same is not true of Rae and Ignatieff.
This leaves us with Jack Layton. On the one hand, he will (for the third consecutive election) increase the NDP seat count. On the other hand, the New Democrats were hoping for a breakthrough in Montreal and to at least challenge the Liberals for the title of Official Opposition. Neither will occur. It looks very much like the NDP is very close to its plateau under Layton and, for the first time in a while, there's an heir apparent in Thomas Mulcair. Back on the first hand, polls consistently show that Layton is (inexplicably) more popular than his party, and this is not a party that has historically been quick to turf underperforming leaders. My bet is that he'll stick around for a while as well.
All of that said, here are my predictions:
* Conservative: 130
* Liberal: 90
* Bloc: 51
* NDP: 35
* Independent: 2
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Subjects that none in the media, and few elsewhere, seem to understand
Margins of error. Hey, media, here's a multiple choice question for you: if Party A leads Party B by 4.99% in a poll whose margin of error (95% confidence interval - i.e. "nineteen times out of twenty") is 5%, what is the chance that Party A is, in fact, ahead of Party B?
a. 50%: because the poll difference is within the poll's margin of error, it's a statistical tie, so there is equal chance of either party being ahead.
b. a hair under 95%: because a difference of 5% gives a 95% certainty of Party A being in the lead, a difference of very slightly under 5% will give a certainty very slightly under 95%.
c. it's impossible to say
(The correct answer is in the comments section, though I like to think that my limited readership is smart enough that it won't need to check.)
a. 50%: because the poll difference is within the poll's margin of error, it's a statistical tie, so there is equal chance of either party being ahead.
b. a hair under 95%: because a difference of 5% gives a 95% certainty of Party A being in the lead, a difference of very slightly under 5% will give a certainty very slightly under 95%.
c. it's impossible to say
(The correct answer is in the comments section, though I like to think that my limited readership is smart enough that it won't need to check.)
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Stealing Paul Wells' links again
Exactly.
Now, the New Democrats are pretty sure that all economists are out to feast on the flesh of the poor, Swift-style (and it's not just economics they distrust - some of them are pretty sure that the underlying math is itself right-wing), so I wouldn't expect them to get this, on acount of ignorance and prejudice. But Harper's got no such excuse to be getting this so monumentally wrong.
Now, the New Democrats are pretty sure that all economists are out to feast on the flesh of the poor, Swift-style (and it's not just economics they distrust - some of them are pretty sure that the underlying math is itself right-wing), so I wouldn't expect them to get this, on acount of ignorance and prejudice. But Harper's got no such excuse to be getting this so monumentally wrong.
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Rankings now, commentary tomorrow maybe
1. Harper
2. May
3. Layton
4. Duceppe
5. Dion
6. Palin (and I don't mean Paikin - seriously, she was just awful)
2. May
3. Layton
4. Duceppe
5. Dion
6. Palin (and I don't mean Paikin - seriously, she was just awful)
Le lendemain
As you may or may not know, I gave Stéphane Dion a hundred bucks back when he was running for Liberal leader (several of my ND friends gave me hell for this; none of them have since recanted and thanked me, strangely). I'm an admirer of his going back to the Clarity Act. I would very much like to see this election result in a Liberal government (minority, preferably), though the chance of that is pretty well at zero. In light of all this, I thought there was some danger that I might go too easy on Dion in my debate reporting. Turns out I might have gone too hard on him. In the debate aftermath, he's gotten the biggest increase in media coverage, and it's been almost entirely positive.
An Ipsos-Reid poll found that 40% of respondents felt that Dion won the debate, well ahead of Duceppe in second at 24%. More significantly, twenty percent of respondents said that the debate changed their mind about who to vote for. That's a significant number. Also interesting is this (desk pound to Paul Wells for that one), which shows that viewers reacted overwhelmingly positively to most of what Dion (and Duceppe) said, and overwhelmingly negatively to most of what Harper said (though a commenter on Wells' blog points out that these reactions took place almost as soon as the leaders in question opened their mouths, suggesting that participants in the study had made up their minds before they actually listened to what the leaders had to say) (Update: Not so, apparently: this is a pie chart showing the participants' political allegiances going into the debate).
Granted, Dion isn't going to perform as well tonight, and granted it's too late for him to win a plurality of seats. But he might be able to salvage the election, and maybe even his leadership, in sort of the same way that John Turner did in 1988. Turner, recall, lost the 1984 election (in fairness, that bit was probably inevitable), with the most enduring moment of the campaign being his telling Mulroney during the leader's debate that "[he] had no choice" but to make a series of patronage appointments. From 1984 until 1988 he was pretty much a lame duck, being plotted against by forces loyal to Jean Chrétien. During the 1988 election, though, fought on free trade, John Turner belatedly emerged as a leader. He lost then too, of course, but he did it with some measure of self-respect and dignity. I believe that 2008 could be Dion's 1988, and carbon emissions could be his free trade. And I even think that if the gap between the Liberals and the Conservatives is less than, say, twenty seats, he might get another chance. But it's possible that I'm being naive here.
Update: Of course, not all the news is good. Don Martin, inexplicably western Canada's most prominent national pundit, suggests that Dion's performance didn't matter, since only the Conservatives and the Bloc have a chance of winning a majority of Quebec's seats. I'm not sure where he's getting that the Conservatives have a chance at winning a majority of Quebec's seats, but they plainly do not; electionprediction.org currently has the absolute best case scenario for the Conservatives as being 21 Quebec seats. Personally, I suspect they'll wind up with as few or fewer than the Liberals. But this is the same Don Martin who went from touting Stockwell Day as the Great Right Hope (from an Alberta base, recall - he had no excuse for ignorance) to complaining that he was all media-pleasing sizzle and no steak, without apparently considering what this said about his own susceptibility to sizzle.
An Ipsos-Reid poll found that 40% of respondents felt that Dion won the debate, well ahead of Duceppe in second at 24%. More significantly, twenty percent of respondents said that the debate changed their mind about who to vote for. That's a significant number. Also interesting is this (desk pound to Paul Wells for that one), which shows that viewers reacted overwhelmingly positively to most of what Dion (and Duceppe) said, and overwhelmingly negatively to most of what Harper said (though a commenter on Wells' blog points out that these reactions took place almost as soon as the leaders in question opened their mouths, suggesting that participants in the study had made up their minds before they actually listened to what the leaders had to say) (Update: Not so, apparently: this is a pie chart showing the participants' political allegiances going into the debate).
Granted, Dion isn't going to perform as well tonight, and granted it's too late for him to win a plurality of seats. But he might be able to salvage the election, and maybe even his leadership, in sort of the same way that John Turner did in 1988. Turner, recall, lost the 1984 election (in fairness, that bit was probably inevitable), with the most enduring moment of the campaign being his telling Mulroney during the leader's debate that "[he] had no choice" but to make a series of patronage appointments. From 1984 until 1988 he was pretty much a lame duck, being plotted against by forces loyal to Jean Chrétien. During the 1988 election, though, fought on free trade, John Turner belatedly emerged as a leader. He lost then too, of course, but he did it with some measure of self-respect and dignity. I believe that 2008 could be Dion's 1988, and carbon emissions could be his free trade. And I even think that if the gap between the Liberals and the Conservatives is less than, say, twenty seats, he might get another chance. But it's possible that I'm being naive here.
Update: Of course, not all the news is good. Don Martin, inexplicably western Canada's most prominent national pundit, suggests that Dion's performance didn't matter, since only the Conservatives and the Bloc have a chance of winning a majority of Quebec's seats. I'm not sure where he's getting that the Conservatives have a chance at winning a majority of Quebec's seats, but they plainly do not; electionprediction.org currently has the absolute best case scenario for the Conservatives as being 21 Quebec seats. Personally, I suspect they'll wind up with as few or fewer than the Liberals. But this is the same Don Martin who went from touting Stockwell Day as the Great Right Hope (from an Alberta base, recall - he had no excuse for ignorance) to complaining that he was all media-pleasing sizzle and no steak, without apparently considering what this said about his own susceptibility to sizzle.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)